Sports and Entertainment Figures (and Others) May Be Able to Deduct Legal Expenses for Criminal Prosecutions (and Wrongful Death Suits) by Dorocak, John R.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Tax Journal Akron Law Journals
1997
Sports and Entertainment Figures (and Others)
May Be Able to Deduct Legal Expenses for
Criminal Prosecutions (and Wrongful Death Suits)
John R. Dorocak
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Tax Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dorocak, John R. (1997) "Sports and Entertainment Figures (and Others) May Be Able to Deduct Legal Expenses
for Criminal Prosecutions (and Wrongful Death Suits)," Akron Tax Journal: Vol. 13 , Article 1.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol13/iss1/1
SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT FIGURES (AND OTHERS)
MAY BE ABLE TO DEDUCT LEGAL EXPENSES
FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (AND WRONGFUL DEATH SUITS)
by
JOHN R. DOROCAK*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 2
II. GILMORE ORIGIN OF CLAIM TEST .............................. 6
III. EXTENSIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF CLAIM TEST: CONNECTION
OF THE CLAIM TO BUSINESS OR INCOME-SEEKING ACTIVITY ........ 7
A. Extending Gilmore: Some Possibilities .................... 8
B. The Conway Twitty Case ............................. 10
IV. CONNECTION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (E.G., O.J.
SIMPSON FOR MURDER) TO BuSINESS OR INCOME SEEKING ......... 13
A.Waldo Salt v. Commissioner ........................... 13
B. The Howard, Lewis, and Draper Cases ................... 14
V. PREVENTION OF DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES BY GOVERNMENT POLICY .. 16
A . Tellier ............................................ 16
B. Heininger ......................................... 17
VI. MURDER CASES ORIGINATING IN THE TAXPAYER'S BUSINESS OR
INCOME-SEEKING ACTrVITY ................................ 18
A. Sturdivant and Hylton ................................ 18
B. Zielezinski ........................................ 20
VII. CASES INVOLVING SPORTS/ENTERTAINMENT FIGURES ORIGINATING IN THE
TAXPAYER'S BUSINESS OR INCOME SEEKING ACTnvITmS ........... 21
A . Harden ........................................... 21
B. Rickard ........................................... 22
VIII. DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES OF A WRONGFUL DEATH CIVIL Surf ....... 22
IX. CONCLUSION ............................................ 24
* John R. Dorocak, Honors A.B., Xavier University, J.D., Case Western Reserve University,
LL.M. (Tax), University of Florida, C.P.A., California and Ohio, is an Associate Professor of
Accounting at California State University, San Bernardino. Thanks to my students who con-
tinually raised the O.J. Simpson case as a discussion topic in class (probably to get the profes-
sor off track and whose comments were met with the professor's query and comments about
the tax significance of the Simpson case) and particularly Azeem Dhalla who pressed the issue
of how related a murder prosecution was to the defendant's trade or business.
1
Dorocak: Sports and Entertainment Figures
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1997
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
As if the American public has not heard enough about the murder trial of
former professional football and entertainment figure Orenthal James (O.J.)
Simpson, this article argues that the legal expenses of a taxpayer situated as Mr.
Simpson may well be deductible.' Given the large number of athletes and enter-
tainers who have had trouble with the law recently, the thesis of this article may
prove of some use.2 (It is the sincere hope of this article's author that the analy-
sis contained herein not be rejected because some may find the defendant tax-
payers, cited as examples, in some way unsavory or unworthy?)
In the unlikely event anyone is unaware of the Simpson case, O.J.
Simpson was charged with the murders of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson,
and her friend, Ron Goldman.' He was found not guilty.' In Mr. Simpson's sit-
uation, the estimates of his legal fees have varied drastically, although commen-
tators concur that they are quite large.6 When a taxpayer is able to deduct legal
fees, as with any deduction, of course, in a sense the Treasury and the American
1. For some background on the O.J. Simpson double murder trial, if any is needed, see, e.g.,
Shirley E. Perlman, O.J. vs. the 'Mountain' Simpson's Attorneys to Begin Their Attack on 5
Months' Evidence, NEWSDAY, July 9, 1995, at A6; The Prosecution Rests, L.A. TIMES, July 7,
1995, at A26.
2. See, e.g., Gordon Forbes, Moon Faces Demons, Takes on Domestic Abuse Issue, USA
TODAY, Sept. 19, 1995, at 8C; David Kronke, Four Talk Shows and a Premiere; It's Damage
Control, Big ime, As Grant Manages to Avoid Tough Questions, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1995, at
F 1 (regarding Hugh Grant and his escapade with prostitute Divine Brown); Mike Lupica,
Darryl Walks on Eggshells, NEWSDAY Aug. 4, 1995, at A95 (regarding Darryl Strawberry,
Dwight Gooden, Steve Howe, et al.); Joe Posnanski, Domestic Abuse at Athlete's Hands: Is
Rage, Like Screams, Inevitable?, CHi. TRIB., Sept. 17, 1995, at 5 (regarding Darryl Strawberry,
Dwight Gooden, et al.); Eric Shepard, Irvin Trial Ends with Plea Deal; Jurisprudence:
Cowboy Avoids Jail ime but Faces the Possibility of NFL Punishment for Cocaine
Possession, L.A. TIMEs, July 16, 1996, at I (regarding Dallas Cowboy's football player
Michael Irvin's plea to cocaine possession); Alexander Wolff, Coaches; Out of Control, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 15, 1995, at 34 (regarding Bobby Cox, Gary Moeller, and Dennis Erickson).
Sadly, there are many more examples in sports and entertainment.
3. The author would have concerns about freedom of speech, censorship, academic freedom,
and the entitlement of clients to vigorous representation (by some counsel). See infra notes
25-26, 176 and accompanying text (regarding the author's reservations about this defendant).
4. State v. Simpson, No. BA-097211 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County June 17, 1994).
5. See, e.g., Paul Pringle & Matt Krasnowski, He Walks; O.J. Vows to Hunt the Real Killers,
STATE J. REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Oct. 4, 1995.
6. See, e.g., Gale Holland, Simpson Still Has Millions, Despite Legal Costs, DET. NEWS, Oct.
24, 1995, atA4 (less than $4 million); Richard Price & Sally A. Stewart, Brown Estate Looking
into Simpson's Assets, USA TODAY, June 14, 1995, at 6A (estimating Simpson's legal bills at
$5 million).
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public at large are paying some of the legal bills. Mr. Simpson's tax situation and
his high profile status are not unique. Convicted Wall Street figures from the late
1980's, Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, reputedly deducted $50 million and
$400 million, respectively, of restitutionary payments, apart from legal fees.7
The basic test for the deductibility of legal expenses is the origin of the
claim test:8 the legal claim must have arisen from the taxpayer's business9 or
income-seeking'0 activity. However, personal expenses are not deductible and,
thus, many legal expenses cannot be deducted." The origin of the claim test was
set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gilmore.2 That Court also
rejected the consequences test - that legal expenses were deductible if the con-
sequences of the legal claim were that the taxpayer's business or income-seeking
activity was affected.' 3 The origin of claim test is not as simple as it might seem
to be. The question, which has often arisen for taxpayers, is how connected must
the claim be to a taxpayer's business or income-seeking activity so that the claim
does arise from the activity.
4
In a number of cases, courts have extended the definition of connected-
ness of a claim. Some commentators have even suggested that there was a third
test, apart from the Gilmore origin of claim test and the rejected consequences
test, based on connectedness and/or motive of the taxpayer."
It is the position of this article that legal expenses of a defendant in cir-
cumstances such as Mr. Simpson's may be deductible under the extended concept
of the connectedness of those expenses to the defendant's business or income-
seeking activity. Two key cases show how connectedness has been extended. In
the memorandum case of Jenkins v. Commissioner, the Tax Court allowed coun-
7. Andrew R. Shoemaker, Note, The Smuggler's Blues: Wood v. United States and the
Resulting Horizontal Inequity Among Criminals in the Allowance of Federal Income Tax
Deductions, II VA. TAX RE. 659, 660 nn. 1-2 (1992).
8. See 523 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at A-13 (Feb. 2, 1996) (discussing the purpose and creation
of the "origin of the claim" test).
9. I.R.C. § 162 (1996).
10. I.R.C. § 212 (1996).
11. Income tax treatment of personal, living, and family expenses is covered by I.R.C. § 262,
which is located in Part IX of Subchapter B, under the heading of "Items Not Deductible."
12. 372 U. S. 39 (1963), rev'g 290 F. 2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
13. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 48.
14. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,667, at 2755 (1983) (the
Conway Twitty case); David R. Brennan & Susan Meggard, Deducting Legal Costs of
Defending Against Claims of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 84 J. TAX'N 94 (1996); see
also infra Part II, Edmond M. Coller, Note, Deductibility of Legal Expenses: The Exclusivity
of Gilmore, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 351 (1965).
15. See Coller, supra note 14, at 352; William D. Powell, Note, Federal Taxation - The
Deductibility of Legal Expenses in the Fourth Circuit - Kopp's Co. v. United States, 17 WAKF
FOREST. L. RV. 1008, 1015 n.75 (1981).
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try western music singer Conway Twitty to deduct the payments (of debts to third
parties, not legal expenses) he made on behalf of his Twitty Burger Restaurants
purportedly to protect his music business reputation. 6 Furthermore, in Salt v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court allowed a movie script writer to deduct his legal
expenses involved in appearing before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities investigating charges of Communist infiltration in the motion picture
industry."
It might be asserted that expenses in the defense of murder are almost
always personal and not business or income-seeking.' 8 A number of cases have
rejected the deductibility of legal expenses for criminal defenses, whether murder
or other crimes were involved, when the taxpayer shows no connectedness, but
only the consequences (i.e., that he would lose his job if convicted).' 9 However,
the position of this article is that, utilizing cases such as Conway Twitty's and
Waldo Salt's, a defendant in Mr. Simpson's situation could deduct legal expenses
based on the connection to his business as a sports and entertainment personality.
In Salt, the Court stated:
Applying here the reasoning and an expression used in the Hein-
inger case, supra, "upon being served" with a subpoena to appear
before the Committee, petitioner "was confronted with a new bus-
iness problem which involved" his present and future business wel-
fare. Ordinary business prudence demanded that petitioner employ
counsel to advise with and represent him in such an emergency. 0
While it might take some amount of legal reasoning to place O.J.
Simpson in a position analogous to that of Waldo Salt, it appears his "dream
team" of legal advisors may have done so. Mr. Simpson's advisors consistently
alleged a police "frame up" which would appear quite analogous to the
Committee's investigation or "witch hunt" (the terminology depending upon
one's politics) of Mr. Salt.2 Other similarly situated taxpayers might not require
the same strenuous legal reasoning or dream team of advisors to achieve
deductibility. One argument made by the Simpson defense team was that the
police intentionally framed the successful black defendant to destroy his prosper-
16. T.C.M. (P-H) 83, 667 at 2755 (1983).
17. 18 T.C. 182 (1952).
18. See, e.g., Sturdivant v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 880, 885 (1950); Hylton v. Commissioner,
T.C.M. (P-H) 73, 262 at 1192 (1973).
19. 1996 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 8476.4253, at 21,724-25, cites cases prior to
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), where the deduction of legal expenses was
denied because the taxpayer was convicted or the charge was settled. See also infra note 24
and accompanying text.
20. T.C. at 186.
21. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
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ity.22 Such a defense, as well as an argument based on Salt, could show the con-
nection of the murder charges to Mr. Simpson's various business activities as an
entertainment and sports figure?23
The Supreme Court has also held that legal expenses of an unsuccessful
defense of a criminal prosecution are deductible where such expenses are related
to business and where allowance of the deduction would not frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies.24 Therefore, regardless of whether the defen-
dants wins or loses in the criminal case, a defendant such as OJ. Simpson might
still prevail on the tax deduction of his legal expenses. The analysis presented
herein uses Mr. Simpson's plight as an example. Again, given the variety of legal
expenses paid by prominent figures in criminal defenses or otherwise, this analy-
sis could be used in a variety of contexts. Some commentators have argued for
expanded deductibility of legal expenses as a way of making legal services more
affordable?15 Possibly with that rationale, this author can present his analysis with
a clearer conscience than afforded by the traditional explanation that every client
is entitled to vigorous representation.26
This article, first, explains the Gilmore origin of claim test.2 Secondly,
the extension of the origin of claim to situations where the legal claim is less
clearly connected to the taxpayer's business or income-seeking activities will be
discussed.28 Thirdly, this article will analyze the issue of how a criminal prosecu-
tion, particularly for a murder in a situation such as Mr. Simpson's, can be con-
nected to business or income-seeking." Fourthly, the issue of whether any gov-
ernment policy would prevent the deduction, especially for an unsuccessful crim-
inal defendant, will be reviewed2 ° Fifthly, prior murder cases in which the defen-
dant was not allowed to deduct legal expenses will be discussed and distin-
22. See, e.g., Paul Pringle & Matt Krasnowski, O.J. Defense Hammers Away at Rascist-Cop
Link, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 29, 1995, at Al; Paul Pringle & Matt Krasnowski, O.J.
Lawyers Get Turn at Bat, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 28, 1995, at Al; Tim Rutten,
Fuhnnan Tapes: Sound and Fury, or Far More?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1995, at Al.
23. See infra part IV.
24. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1996), aff'g 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'g
32 T.C.M. (P-H) % 63,212, at 1207 (1963).
25. Robert L. Sklodowski & Douglas J. Rathe, Aid For the Middle Class: Deduction of Legal
Expenses, 85 CASE & COM. Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 40.
26. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.3 (1995); see also infra part
V (suggesting if legal expenses are more tenuously connected to a taxpayer's business or
income-seeking, the taxpayer might need to prevail in litigation, especially criminal litigation).
27. See infra Section II.
28. See infra Section HI.
29. See infra Section IV.
30. See infra Section V.
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guished.3' Sixthly, cases in which sports/entertainment figures have been denied
similar deductions will be addressed." Finally, deduction of expenses of a wrong-
ful death civil suit will be discussed. 33
II. GILMORE ORIGIN OF CLAIM TEST
In United States v. Gilmore, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the origin
of claim test as follows: "[T]he origin and character of the claim with respect to
which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the
fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was
'business' or 'personal' and hence whether it is deductible or not ..... I To deter-
mine whether a claim arises out of a business or income-seeking activity of a tax-
payer, several factors must be examined. One court suggested that these factors
include "the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the litigation, the
defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions were expended,
the background of the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the controversy."35
Gilmore involved legal expenses incurred in a divorce proceeding.3 6 The
taxpayer/husband's property consisted mainly of controlling stock interests in
three corporations, each a General Motors ("GM") auto dealership.37 The husband
derived his income of salary and dividends through the stock ownership and con-
trol of the corporations.38 He contested his wife's claim to more than one-half of
the stock as community property because he feared losing his job due to his wife's
control of the stock and to reputation-damaging publicity (so that GM might
revoke the dealerships). 39 The Supreme Court held that the origin and character
of the husband's claim was personal, and, therefore, the legal expenses were not
deductible.' The Court so held irrespective of the fact that a probable conse-
quence of the wife prevailing would be a loss of income-producing property.4'
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court may have thought it was enunci-
ating a clear-cut standard, subsequent courts and commentators have not been as
confident that Gilmore is an easily applied rule. The author of a Note written
within two years after the Gilmore decision questioned the "exclusivity" of
31. See infra Section VI.
32. See infra Section VII.
33. See infra Section VIII.
34. 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963).
35. Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 713 (1973).
36. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 40.
37. Id. at 41 n.5.
38. Id. at 41.
39. Id. at 41-42.
40. Id. at 44.
41. Id. at 50-51.
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Gilmore.42 That author explains that Gilmore did adopt the origin test and reject-
ed the consequences test, but apparently left open a third test concerning con-
nectedness or the primary or dominant purpose of the lawsuit. 3
Other cases and other commentators seem to agree that Gilmore is not so
rigid as to preclude the deductibility of expenses where the legal claim is some-
how connected to the taxpayer's business or income-seeking activities. For
example, in Dolese v. United States,44 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals distin-
guished Gilmore in a case involving a different set of facts and a divorce pro-
ceeding. That Court of Appeals allowed a deduction for corporate legal expens-
es arising out of the divorce proceeding between the shareholder/husband of the
corporations and his wife where the corporations were named as parties/defen-
dants in the litigation 5 One commentator characterizes Dolese as an "involun-
tary" defendant gloss on Gilmore!6 That same commentator explains a Fourth
Circuit case as a "direct liability" gloss when a corporation was exposed to suit
because of a state statute. There the father/owner of the corporation lent a com-
pany-owned vehicle to his son for personal use and the son was involved in an
automobile accident 7
Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Lykes v.
United States stated about the origin of claim test: "So treacherous is this kind of
reasoning that in most fields the law rests its conclusion only on proximate cause
and declines to follow the winding trail of remote and multiple causations."48
There is apparently an extended concept of connectedness of a claim to
business or income-seeking activity by a taxpayer after Gilmore."9 The next sec-
tion of this article will discuss the extended definition of connectedness, particu-
larly how the extensions are relevant to the deductibility of legal expenses for
criminal prosecutions for sports and entertainment figures such as an O.J.
Simpson.
m11. EXTENSIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF CLAIM TEST: CONNECTION OF THE CLAIM TO
BusINEsS OR INCOME-SEEKING ACTIVITY
Although Gilmore set forth a strict origin of claim test, extensions of that
42. See Coller supra note 14.
43. Id. at 352, 359.
44. 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979), reh. denied, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19731 at 85,418,
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
45. Id. at 1151-52.
46. See Powell, supra note 15, at 1017.
47. Id.
48. 343 U.S. 118, 128 (1952).
49. See 523 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) atA-14 (Feb. 2, 1996); Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (RIA) L-
2901, L-2902, at 34,226 (Apr. 25, 1996).
1997]
7
Dorocak: Sports and Entertainment Figures
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1997
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
test apparently have been allowed, judging from commentary and subsequent
court cases.50 In Gilmore itself, Justices Black and Douglas dissented believing
that the majority's interpretation of deductibility was "unjustifiably narrow."'s
Apparently, as indicated below, many courts implicitly have shared the concern of
the two dissenting justices.
A. Extending Gilmore: Some Possibilities
Tolzman v. Commissioner is an example of a court extending the Gilmore
test.52 The petitioner/husband owned a one-fourth interest in a partnership, which
in turn owned 50% of an entity, ULT Co. 3 Petitioner possessed guaranteed notes
issued by ULT for bank loans and also executed a deed of trust on his personal
residence to secure these notes.' A third party assignee of the notes brought a
foreclosure suit against the petitioner's residence.15 The court determined that the
legal expenses of the foreclosure suit were deductible because the claim arose
both from the petitioner's business as an employee of ULT and from petitioner's
income-seeking activity.56
The Tolzman Court reasoned that as long as part of the motive for guar-
anteeing the notes was business, the legal expenses of the foreclosure suit were
business connected and, therefore, deductible. 7 (The court so reasoned despite
holding that the guarantee was a non-business bad debt because the petitioner's
dominant motive was not to save his job as an employee.) 8 In addition, the court
reasoned that the legal expenses were the proximate cause of the business-related
guarantee because "but for" the guarantee the foreclosure suit would not have
been instituted.59
It is the position of this article that O.J. Simpson's legal expenses for the
defense of the murder charges are deductible under cases such as Tolzman which
extend the more narrow ruling of Gilmore. At least part of Mr. Simpson's motive
for defending in the law suit was to preserve his business reputation and viability
as a sports and entertainment figure. At least one "but for" analysis would be that
the defense would not have been necessary except for the defendant's need to
50. See Coller, supra note 14; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
51. 372 U.S. 39, 52 (1963).
52. 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,689, at 2671 (1981).
53. Id. at 2672.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2674.
56. Id. at 2678
57. Id. at 2678-79.
58. Id. at 2678-79 nn. 17-18.
59. Id. at 2679.
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clear his reputation in light of an alleged frame by the Los Angeles police.
In analogous cases, not involving legal expenses but other expenses,
courts have held for deductibility where taxpayers were able to show that the pay-
ment of the expenses was connected to preservation of their business reputa-
tions? Since the deductibility of other expenses and the legal expenses both
depend on Code sections 162 and/or 212, these analogous cases should be applic-
able. In United States v. Young, a practicing attorney was allowed to deduct pay-
ments on a debt from another of his businesses, to a trash hauling business, as
expenses of his law practice because the payments were made to protect his busi-
ness reputation as an attomey.6' In the taxpayer's oil and gas law practice, he gen-
erated approximately three-fourths of his clientele and income from two clients.62
On behalf of those clients he would purchase leases and actually arrange for
financing the leases.63 The court concluded, "For Mr. Young to maintain and con-
tinue in his established oil and gas law practice, it was necessary for him to main-
tain a good credit rating .... 4
It might appear that the payments on the trash hauling debt were only
related to the law practice under a consequences test in that failure to pay off the
debt might impact the taxpayer's reputation as an attorney. However, as set forth
above, the court found a more specific connection between the failure to pay the
trash business debt and the ability to do business as an attorney.5 Still, it is clear
that the trash business debt did not have its origin in the law business. The court
held that the "principal motivation" of the taxpayer in making the payments was
to protect his personal credit and his law practice.6 6 The Young Court further stat-
ed: "A taxpayer may properly recognize a moral obligation in paying the debt of
another .... In this situation the jurisprudence does not require a precise similar-
ity or strong connexity between the business benefited and the taxpayer making
the payment .... "67
Glick v. United States is a pre-Gilmore case in which a certified public
accountant deducted legal expenses, rather than analogous expenses, in defending
a suit to set aside a property settlement instituted by his former wife.68 Again, the
case might appear to allow the deduction of legal expenses based on the conse-
quences test. However, the court also appeared to find some extended connec-
60. See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
61. 604 F.Supp. 164 (N.D. Okla. 1984).
62. Id. at 169.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 169-70.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 171 (citations omitted).
68. 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9289, at 67,718 (N.D. Il. 1958).
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tion of the claim to the husband's business: "The charges made by Dorothy Glick
against Harry Glick did attack his reputation and business standing, and, if not
refuted, very likely would have directly and adversely affected his ability to pro-
duce income."'69
The above cases, whether involving expenses of legal fees or other
expenses, all seem to indicate a test for deduction of expenses beyond a strict ori-
gin of the claim test while still not quite adopting a consequences test. In Tolzman,
the taxpayer guaranteed a debt at least partially with the motive of protecting his
business, and argued the legal claim against him would not have resulted but for
the guarantee of this debt. 0 Similarly in Young, the principal purpose of the tax-
payer's paying debts of another business was to protect an essential credit rating
for his law business and, thus, a connection between the expense and the law
business was established.7' Additionally, in Glick, the former wife's litigation
brought under attack the husband's business reputation.'
B. The Conway Twitty Case
Of all the cases extending the connection between an expense and the tax-
payer's business, maybe the best example is found in Jenkins v. Commissioner
(the "Conway Twitty" case).73 In Jenkins, the petitioner, Harold L. Jenkins, was a
popular country western singer whose stage name is Conway Twitty.7 Twitty and
several of his friends formed a restaurant business, Twitty Burger Fast Food
Restaurants.75 After the restaurant failed, Twitty decided that each of the investors
should be repaid the amount of money invested in the restaurants.76 The sole issue
before the court was whether the repayments were deductible as ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses of Twitty's business as a country music performer."
(Petitioners conceded that the amounts repaid did not constitute deductible bad
debt expenses and the court reasoned that those amounts need not be a capital
contribution to the restaurant business if they were an ordinary and necessary
expense of the petitioner's country music business.78)
After examining cases considering the deductibility of business expens-
69. Id. at 67,719; see also infra note 96 and accompanying text (regarding a similar suit where
the wife's back-due alimony claims even more directly affected the husband's business since the
Army instituted a court martial).
70. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,677, at 2755 (1983).
74. Id. at 2756.
75. Id. at 2757.
76. Id. at 2758.
77. Id. at 2759.
78. Id. at 2759 & n.8.
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es, the Jenkins Court determined that a two part test must be satisfied for
deductibility. The court first stated that the payments must be made primarily
with a business motive and, that secondly, there must be "a sufficient connection
between the expenditures and the taxpayer's trade or business."
The court held (1) "Conway Twitty repaid the investors in Twitty Burger
with the primary motive of protecting his personal business reputation," and (2)
"[a]dditionally, many of the investors were connected with the country music
industry." 0 In summary, the court stated: "We conclude that there was a proxi-
mate relationship between the payments made to the holders of Twitty Burger
debentures and petitioner's trade or business as a country music entertainer so as
to render those payments an ordinary and necessary expense of the business."',
Admittedly, Jenkins is not about the deductibility of legal expenses.
However, it is about the deductibility of expenses under section 162 and whether
such expenses are sufficiently connected to a particular business. The Tax Court
report of the case contains verbatim some very illuminating (and, apparently,
unusual) direct testimony from Twitty, expert testimony from the Director of the
Country Music Foundation in Nashville, and the court's "Ode to Conway Twitty."
Petitioner testified that he paid the expenses because of image, morals, and to
avoid a law suit. In part, Twitty stated:
Because of the image. And second and very close to it, I handled
it that way because I think it is morally right ....
... And so you - you don't want any part of that. A law suit like
that with - say if Merle Haggard sued Conway Twitty or if Walter
Beach sued Conway Twitty.... If my fans didn't give up on me, it
would warp me psychologically.
... [A]nd the reason you have that longevity ... is because of the fan
... They will stay right with you as long as you stay within a cer-
tain boundaries.82
William Ivey, the Director of the Country Music Foundation in Nashville,
also was quoted at length in the Tax Court opinion. Mr. Ivey testified:
79. Id. at 2761.
80. Id. at 2762.
81. Id. at 2764.
82. Id. at 2762-63.
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This tendency to link a performer's non-performing image with-
his artistry exists to some degree in all of art ....
... The reputation of an entertainer among business associates and
within the financial community can have a determinative role in that
artist's ability to conduct his affairs.
Reputation can have an even greater effect upon an entertainer as
it influences fans....
... George Jones, Waylon Jennings, and Johnny Paycheck are all
great entertainers, but each has been plagued by personal problems
which have limited the extent of their success .... In fact, his per-
formance in the Twitty Burger matter became another ingredient in
Conway's positive image....
•.. [A] country entertainer's character, personality, and credit rep-
utation are part and parcel of his role as a singer. This integration of
art and the individual existed in the folk communities from which
country music grew .... 11
The court concluded in poetic verse:
Had Conway not repaid the investors
His career would have been under a cloud,
Under the unique facts of this case
Held: The deductions are allowed."
Much of what was said by Twitty, the expert witness, and the court about
the connection of the expenditures to Twitty's business reputation could be said
about the need for an individual such as O.J. Simpson to protect his business rep-
utation. Mr. Simpson's ability to successfully appear in commercial endorse-
ments, motion pictures, and sports broadcasts seems clearly linked to his non-per-
forming image, as was Conway Twitty's success in country music linked to his
off-stage reputation. (Although some suggested Simpson might profit also from
his new notorious reputation, events following his successful defense and acquit-
tal have suggested otherwise. 5)
83. Id. at 2763-64.
84. Id. at 2765 n.14.
85. See, e.g., Gale Holland, Simpson Still has Millions, Despite Legal Costs, DEr. NEWs, Oct.
24, 1995, at A4; James F. McCarty, Juicy Joltings; Solon Company Cashing In on O.J.
Simpson's Signature, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 2, 1994, at IA; Haya El Nasser, Defense
Team's Biggest Bonus: The Publicity, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 1994, at 4A. But see Mike Lihwin,
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However, a taxpayer positioneci as Mr. Simpson would still have hurdles
to clear in order to successfully claim the deductiori. Since, as the Conway Twitty
Court stated, these decisions are fact-based, the vanou ,trands of the analysis are
often difficult to separate." The Boagni Court explaind, "[q]uite plainly, the 'ori-
gin-of-the-claim' rule does not contemplate a mechanical search fnr the first in the
chain of events which led to the litigation but, rather, requires an examination of
all the facts."87
Even upon a showing of connection similar to that of Conway Twitty's,
there seems to be another facet of the intertwined arguments which the IRS could
raise and a court could accept. A possible argument may be that the lawsuit from
which legal expenses arises is a personal one because the claim does not arise out
of business, despite the fact that motivation to pay the expenses and other con-
nections to the business can be shown. This argument would seem to return to the
origin of claim test by another path. However, it is the position of this article, that,
even upon this return to the origin of claim test, the taxpayer has additional argu-
ments to place on the scales of justice in order to persuade a court to somehow
extend the interpretation of connection of the claim to business. The next section
of this article will discuss different cases involving the connection of legal
expenses to a taxpayer's business.
IV. CONNECTION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (E.G., O.J. SIMPSON FOR
MURDER) TO BUSINESS OR INCOME SEEKING
It is the position of this paper that a defendant such as Mr. Simpson may
be able to deduct legal expenses for his defense against criminal charges, extend-
ing even to murder. Mr. Simpson's tax position could possibly be based solely on
the Conway Twitty case discussed above. However, there are other cases with a
slightly different approach that are helpful.
A. Waldo Salt v. Commissioner
Although it did not involve a criminal prosecution, the tax case of Waldo
Salt provides an excellent example of how a criminal defendant such as Mr.
Simpson might be able to show a connection of his legal expenses to his business
or income-seeking activities. In Salt, a movie script writer was summoned to
appear before the House Committee on Un-American Activities potentially to
give testimony in a hearing "to investigate whether there existed communistic
Imagine;... A 71me when O.J. is no Longer of Interest to Anyone, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, June 13, 1996, Editorial, at 23A (discussing, the inability of Simpson to profit
because of perceived tarnished reputation).
86. See Jenkins, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,667, at 2761-62 (1983).
87. Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 713 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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infiltration in the motion picture industry, whether any of its employees were
Communists, and whether the scope of the plays produced were subversive and
designed to promote communism."88 A group of nineteen individuals (fourteen
writers, three directors, one actor, and one assistant producer, including the tax-
payer) collectively employed four different firms of lawyers "to represent and
advise them with reference to their rights and duties as witnesses ... and also to
aid in preventing a threatened blacklisting."89
The Salt Court stated, "[tihe group contributed, each in proportion to his
earnings, an aggregate sum of $40,000 in payment of attorneys' fees and expens-
es incurred by their attorneys.9 ° The court concluded, "[t]he result of the inves-
tigation was calculated to affect the future of the motion picture industry as a
whole and also the petitioner's employment therein."9 As set forth earlier in this
article, the court reasoned, "'[u]pon being served' with a subpoena to appear
before the Committee, petitioner 'was confronted with a new business problem
which involved' his present and future business welfare."9
Therefore, the Salt Court held, "[t]hat petitioner's employment of attor-
neys was occasioned by and directly connected with his business is apparent."93
Apparently the same can be said about Mr. Simpson's employment of his attor-
neys. Mr. Simpson's employment of his attorneys is connected with his business
based on the defense theory that he was investigated, and potentially "framed,"
because he was a successful black individual operating as a sports and entertain-
ment industry unto himself.94 Mr. Simpson, like Waldo Salt, "'was confronted
with a new business problem which involved' his present and future business wel-
fare. 9 5
B. The Howard, Lewis, and Draper Cases
The above application of the Salt Court's reasoning to a situation such as
Mr. Simpson's might indicate that the motive of the prosecuting party should be
used to determine whether the legal proceeding is connected to the defendant's
business. The Salt Court cited a previous case, Howard v. Commissioner con-
cerning deductibility of legal expenses of an army officer defending against court-
martial.96 Howard was allowed to deduct his legal expenses, even though the
88. 18 T.C. at 184-85.
89. Id. at 183-84.
90. Id. at 184.
91. Id. at 186.
92. Id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
93. 18 T.C. at 186.
94. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
95. Salt, 18 T.C. at 186 (quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 472 (1943)).
96. Id.
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charges arose from a marital dispute (alimony in arrears), since those charges
were prosecuted in a court-martial where the prosecutor's (the Army's) motive
was to deprive the taxpayer of his business status as a commissioned officer.97
A subsequent case, Lewis v. Commissioner,98 is also cited in Howard.
However, the Lewis Court distinguished Howard 9 In Lewis, the taxpayer/hus-
band successfully defended himself against two proceedings brought by his wife
to have him (1) committed to a mental institution and (2) declared mentally
incompetent.1'0 The Tax Court and Second Circuit both denied a deduction for the
taxpayer-husband's legal expenses in the two proceedings. 0' The Lewis Court,
distinguishing Howard, stated: "[i]n the present case, by contrast, the charge that
the taxpayer was incompetent was not directed at destroying his trade or business,
but was directed at the totality that is the individual, Lewis."1
2
The Lewis Court also distinguished the case of Draper v.
Commissioner.13 The court distinguished Draper as follows:
There the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer, an entertainer whose
livelihood was threatened by charges that he was a Communist, a
deduction for expenses incurred by him in the prosecution of a libel
action. Though we agree with the petitioner that Draper v.
Commissioner to some extent supports his position, we decline to
accept that Tax Court decision as controlling authority .... The effect
upon the individual's trade or business, harmful though it may be,
is merely incidental to the harm which he otherwise suffers ....
Detrimental to his trade the charges may have been; yet they were not,
as in Heininger, Howard, and Salt, directed to his occupational
activities as such.1w
As the Lewis Court stated, in cases such as Howard and Salt, where the
charges are directed against the business of the defendant, legal expenses are
deductible.' 5 The same reasoning should apply to Mr. Simpson. In fact, tax
payer Lewis might have been allowed the deduction of his legal expenses had he
been able to show a motive of his wife directed at his business. As stated by the
Conway Twitty Court and the Boagni Court, these decisions are factually based. °6
97. Howard v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 157 (1951).
98. 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'g 27 T.C. 158 (1956).
99. Id. at 825-26.
100. Id. at 823.
101. Id. at 828.
102. Id. at 825.
103. Id. at 826 (citing Draper v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 201 (1956)).
104. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the Draper case may have been correctly decided, despite the Lewis
Court's distinguishing that case.
In Draper, the petitioner was a professional dancer.07 A Mrs. Hester
McCullough made statements to the effect that the petitioner was pro-
Communist. 8 The petitioner filed a libel action.,, Mrs. McCullough had said
among other things that she wanted "to hit these boys in their box office.""' 0 Based
on Mrs. McCullough's motive to affect taxpayer Draper's business, the case
appears reconcilable with Salt and Howard. All of these cases would appear to
support a deduction for a defendant such as Mr. Simpson, based on the analysis
that the prosecuting party's motive in instituting the action was to affect the busi-
ness of the defendant, or, at least that the police department's, or some of its offi-
cers', motive was such.
If a defendant such as Mr. Simpson alleges prosecutorial conduct and
motive in a criminal case directed toward his business, the next natural query
would be whether a defendant losing his case could still deduct the legal expens-
es.
V. PREVENTION OF DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES BY GOVERNMENT POLICY
A crime committed by a taxpayer is another legal claim which may have
its origin in the trade or business or income-seeking activity of that taxpayer.
Legal expenses for defending against-the prosecution of a crime are deductible, as
are other legal expenses, as long as the claim, the crime, has its origin in business
or income-seeking. The deduction of the legal expenses connected to business or
income-seeking will be allowed even for an unsuccessful defense against the
criminal prosecution. Only the frustration of sharply defined national or state
policies by allowing a deduction of legal expenses will prevent such deduction."'
A. Tellier
In Commissioner v. Tellier, the U.S. Supreme Court used the origin of
claim test to hold that expenses of an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecu-
tion were deductible."' In Tellier, the taxpayer was a securities dealer engaged in
underwriting the public sale of stock offerings and purchasing securi-
ties for resale to customers."3 He had unsuccessfully defended a criminal pros-
107. Draper, 26 T.C. 201, 202 (1956).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 203.
111. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
112. 383 U.S. 687 (1966), aff'g 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'g 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 63,212,
at 1207 (1963).
113. Id. at 688.
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ecution for fraud under the Securities Act of 1933."1 The Court held that the legal
expenses of the unsuccessful defense were related to the taxpayer's business and
that no public policy prevented the deduction of the expenses."' The Court rea-
soned:
Only where the allowance of a deduction would "frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies proscribing particular forms of
conduct" have we upheld its disallowance ....
... No public policy is offended when a man faced with serious
criminal charges employs a lawyer to help in his defense. That is not
"proscribed conduct." It is his constitutional right.,6
Tellier was the first case in which the expenses of an unsuccessful
criminal defense were allowed to be deducted." 7
B. Heininger
The closest the Supreme Court came to allowing a deduction of legal
expenses for an unsuccessful defense of a criminal action prior to Tellier was the
case of Commissioner v. Heininger,"8 cited both in Tellier and Salt.119 In
Heininger, the Supreme Court held that a dentist could deduct legal expenses for
the unsuccessful defense of resisting a Postmaster-General's order terminating the
dentist's mall-order denture business because of fraud.2 0 The Court reasoned that
the legal fees were directly connected to the dentist's mail-order business and that
there was no clearly defined governmental policy requiring denial of the deduc-
tion.' The Heininger Court drew a distinction between statutes protecting the
public and statutes that were punitive. As a result, the public policy rationale of
denying the deduction for criminal expenses where the defense was unsuccessful
continued until Tellier.'2
Since Tellier adopted the Gilmore origin of the claim test for legal
expenses involved in an unsuccessful criminal defense,1n the difficulty in the
114. Id.
115. ld. at 694-95.
116. Id. at 694 (quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943)).
117. 523 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) atA-36 (Feb. 2, 1996); Carter Bledsoe, The Deduction of Legal
Fees Relating to Crimes, Divorce, and Taxes, 18 Rns. L. REV. 862, 863 (1967).
118. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
119. See Tellier, 383 U.S. at 693-94; Salt v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 182, 185-87 (1952).
120. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 475.
121. Id. at 472.
122. Bledsoe, supra note 117, at 864-65.
123. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 689.
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criminal prosecution area, as with other legal claims for the taxpayer, is whether
the criminal prosecution is related to the taxpayer's trade or business, or income-
seeking activity.2 4 The next section of this article specifically discusses murder
prosecution cases involving taxpayers seeking to deduct their defense expenses,
as well as the issue of whether the prosecution arises in the taxpayer's business or
income-seeking activities.
Legal expenses of a taxpayer in a unsuccessful civil suit for that taxpay-
er are, of course, deductible. For example, in Draper v. Commissioner, the tax-
payer was unsuccessful in his libel case when the jury failed to reach a verdict.
The case was not retried.I12 Taxpayer Draper, though, was able to deduct the legal
expenses. 26
VI. MURDER CASES ORIGINATING IN THE TAXPAYER'S BUSINESS
OR INCOME-SEEKING Ac'nvlTY
It appears that courts frequently find that crimes such as murder did not
have their origin in the business or income-seeking activities of taxpayers.' 27
However, one commentator discussing the extension of the Gilmore test states:
The very fact that the courts have refused to be limited by the origin test
indicates that considerable judicial opinion favors a more expansive
reading. Every Supreme Court case which clearly articulated an ori-
gin test, except Deputy, was dissented to on the ground that the test
unduly limits deductibility. Indeed, the current treasury regulation
states that "expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to the
taxpayer's trade or business" are deductible, language which is clearly
broader in scope than the origin test. Finally, the Bingham Case...
restated the original Kornhauser formulation disjunctively-"directly
connected with or proximately resulted from the conduct of the tax-
payer's business.' 2 8
A. Sturdivant and Hylton
In Sturdivant v. Commissioner, the court held that legal fees paid by a
partnership for defense of two partners and an employee indicted for murder and
for the settlement of a civil claim arising from the same killing were not
deductible.12 9 In that case, one of the taxpayers, B.W. Sturdivant, along with two
124. See 523 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at A36.
125. 26 T.C. 201 (1956).
126. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text; see also 523 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at A36.
128. Coller, supra note 14, at 358 (footnotes omitted).
129. 15 T.C. 880 (1950).
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other individuals, shot and killed Dr. Alexander, a physician, with whom the tax-
payers had a difference of opinion about whether they were allowed, under the
terms of a business contract, to haul wood from the latter's property.' 3 The court
denied the deduction of the legal expenses, stating that the crime was "purely
personal", and distinguishing Heininger where the taxpayer's actions were "in
defense of his business."'3 Sturdivant would seem to be a close case, which could
have been decided the opposite way, concerning whether the legal claim, the
criminal prosecution, originated in the taxpayer's business.
In Hylton v. Commissioner, the taxpayer went to the home of his
estranged wife to obtain her signature on a federal income tax return and, follow-
ing an altercation with his wife's brother and sister-in-law, the taxpayer shot and
killed both the brother and sister-in-law. 32 The court held that the murder prose-
cution did not originate in any business or income-seeking activity of the peti-
tioner because the court found that the petitioner, arguing pro se, "does not con-
tend that the legal fee in question was related to his business or profit-seeking."' 33
The court also stated that the taxpayer was only considering "the consequences of
an adverse result ... whereas it is the origin of the controversy that is control-
ling." ' Even in Hylton, the taxpayer may have been able to argue that the crime
arose in circumstances in which he was conducting an income- seeking activity
because tax return was involved. The court's finding was that the taxpayer had
not so argued or offered evidence for either of these reasons for deduction.
A defendant situated in such a position as Mr. Simpson would seem to
have an easier time arguing that the criminal prosecution originated in his busi-
ness or income-seeking activities. As suggested earlier in this article,'33 a defen-
dant such as Mr. Simpson need only argue that the legal expenses were incurred
because the criminal prosecution constituted an investigation of his business,
analogizing it to the investigation of screen writer Waldo Salt's business by the
House Un-American Activities Committee. Also, Mr. Simpson's expenditures to
protect his reputation as an entertainment and sports figure could also be said to
be similar to Conway Twitty's expenditures incurred as a result of his Twitty
Burger Restaurants as he sought to protect his reputation as a country music
singer. It should not matter for deductibility that the crime, such as murder in
Simpson's case, arose in a personal rather than in a business context. What should
be controlling for the taxpayer would be the fact that the investigation or motive
130. Id. at 881-82.
131. ld. at 885.
132. 42 T.C. M. (P-H) 73,262, at 1191 (1973).
133. Id. at 1192.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
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of the prosecuting party was related to the taxpayer's business or income-seeking
activities and/or that the payments by the taxpayer were motivated by the taxpay-
er's desire to protect his business reputation.
B. Zielezinski
Under Tellier, the deductibility of legal expenses is not dependent upon
whether the defendant/taxpayer wins or loses.'36 However, the cases and public
policy or public conscience might suggest something of a sliding scale - i.e., if
a crime is less directly connected to a taxpayer's trade or business, then the tax-
payer-defendant must prevail in a criminal prosecution. Although Tellier seems
to have banished a rule requiring the defendant to prevail, Tellier may not be so
clear cut, and may be subject to many extensions as was the Gilmore rule of ori-
gin of the claim. For example, in Zielezinski v. Commissioner,', a firefighter pled
guilty, under a plea bargain, to a misdemeanor of narcotics possession. The plea
resulted from an investigation of an alleged drug ring in the Phoenix fire depart-
ment.' The taxpayer was denied the deduction of legal expenses involved in the
plea because the narcotics violations were not part of his normal duties as a fire-
fighter, not authorized by his employer, and not related to his business as a fire-
fighter.'39 Thus the court held, under Gilmore, that the criminal charges arose out
of personal conduct and not business or income-seeking.'40
It seems difficult, at least in part, to reconcile Zielezinski with Salt and
Howard. (Salt involved the Hollywood writer investigated by the House Un-
American Activities Committee and Howard involved the Army officer court-
martialed for back-due alimony.' 4') Salt and Zielezinski both ostensibly involved
the investigation of an industry for illegal conduct. Howard and Zielezinski both
involved prosecution of a taxpayer in uniform who would lose his status if con-
victed. The difference in these cases, as suggested previously, 142 may be that the
prosecuting party's motive in Salt and Howard was directed at curtailing the tax-
payer's business. In Zielezinski, the motive apparently was not directed at the tax-
payer's business; the business was only affected consequentially, if at all. In addi-
tion, it may be somewhat easier to detect a motive aimed at a taxpayer's business
where the taxpayer is a more prominent individual (even a Hollywood writer as
Salt or an officer as Howard).
136. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
137. 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 87,293, at 1449 (1987).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1449.
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, Salt and Zielezinski did both involve investigations
concerning outside influences in an industry. Furthermore, Howard and
Zielezinski both involved infractions which, although possibly personal, also vio-
lated a code of conduct observation of which was essential for maintaining the
taxpayer's position as an officer. In light of these similarities, possibly another
explanation (other than that Salt and Howard were pre-Tellier and not classic
crimes) is that where a crime is less clearly connected to the taxpayer's business
(such as in Zielezinski), the taxpayer must prevail in the criminal case to be
allowed the deduction. Salt was not blacklisted nor Howard convicted, and both
were allowed to deduct their legal expenses.
VII. CASES INVOLVING SPORTS/ENTERTAINMENT FIGURES ORIGINATING IN THE
TAXPAYER'S BUSINESS OR INCOME-SEEKING ACTIVITIES
A. Harden
In Harden v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, a professional football player,
paid his ex- girlfriend an amount in return for her agreement to drop a complaint
and keep it confidential. 43 The taxpayer's ex-girlfriend had filed a criminal com-
plaint against him for sexual assault) 4 The taxpayer's employer, the Denver
Broncos Football Club, informed the taxpayer that, if the charge against him
became public, he would not be rejoining the team as an employee.45 As such, the
taxpayer's settlement with his ex-girlfriend recited that "prosecution of this claim
in either a civil or criminal form would result in irreparable damage to petition-
er's image and reputation and directly affect his continued employment."' 4
The court held that the amount paid by the taxpayer to the ex-girlfriend
in the year at issue was not deductible. 47 The court cited the Gilmore origin of
claim test and reasoned that (1) "[p]etitioner confuses the origin of the complaint
with its consequences" and (2) "potential criminal charges and the criminal com-
plaint arose from a personal relationship.'48 The court also distinguished the
Conway Twitty case cited by the taxpayer stating: "In that case the issue before
this Court was whether a payment on behalf of a corporation was a capital con-
tribution or was an expense of the taxpayer's business."'' 49
The taxpayer had argued that his primary "motivation" in making the
payment to his ex-girlfriend was to protect his professional and public reputa-
143. 60 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 91,454, at 2262 (1991).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2263.
147. Id. at 2264.
148. Id. at 2263.
149. Id. at 2264.
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tion.150 It would seem that the taxpayer was within the rule of the Conway Twitty
case. The Harden Court's characterization of the Twitty case seems to ignore that
court's statement that "[t]he sole issue presented for our decision is whether pay-
ments made by petitioner... are deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses .... " The Twitty Court explained:
The general rule is that a shareholder may not deduct a payment
made on behalf of the corporation but rather must treat it as a cap-
ital expenditure .... However, the payment may be deducted if it is an
ordinary and necessary expense of a trade or business of the share-
holder.'-"
It would seem, then, that the Harden Court rather strictly applied the
Gilmore test, misinterpreted the Twitty case, and ignored the extensions of
Gilmore. Apparently both Mr. Harden and Mr. Simpson should be able to deduct
their legal expenses under the same theory as Conway Twitty deducted his
expenses; i.e., success in on-field or on-stage business was linked to off-field or
off-stage reputation so that legal expenses of defending that reputation are
deductible. As the Twitty court explained in verse, Harden and Simpson would
as surely be under a "cloud" '53 which would affect their businesses as would
Twitty, Salt, or Howard if they had not incurred expenses.
B. Rickard
Similarly, in Rickard v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, a sports promoter,
would have been able to deduct his legal expenses for defending against a crimi-
nal charge had he shown the connection of the criminal charge with his trade or
business.'54 The court reasoned: "The evidence does not disclose the nature of the
criminal offense. It does not disclose in what way, if any, the criminal offense was
connected with the petitioner's business .... 55
The petitioner failed in Rickard apparently because of a proof problem in
the facts and circumstance issue of connection of the claim to business.
VIII. DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES OF A WRONGFUL DEATH CIVIL SUIT
If a defendant such as O.J. Simpson can, as indicated in this article,
deduct his legal expenses for a defense against a criminal prosecution for murder,
150. Id. at 2263.
151. 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,667, at 2759 (1983).
152. Id. (footnote omitted).
153. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
154. 12 B.T.A. 836, 937 (1928).
155. Id.
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it seems likely that such a defendant would also be entitled to deduct legal expens-
es for a defense against a civil action for wrongful death. As set forth above, Mr.
Simpson might be able to deduct the criminal defense legal expenses using the
analysis of the Conway Twitty case."6 If Mr. Simpson were successful in deduct-
ing the criminal defense legal expenses based on the theory that they were
necessary to protect his business reputation, as were Conway Twitty's expendi-
tures, then it would seem that legal expenses in defense of a civil suit for wrong-
ful death arising from the same deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron
Goldman would also be deductible for protection of business reputation.
Furthermore, as set forth above in this paper,57 Mr. Simpson may be able
to deduct his criminal defense expenses based on Salt and Draper. Mr. Simpson,
as Waldo Salt, found his business under investigation. Thus, both these investi-
gated parties should be able to deduct legal expenses, whether criminal or civil
(although expenses for a civil wrongful death suit might be distinguishable from
Salt since the investigating party is not governmental as in Salt or Simpson's
criminal trial).
With regard to an attempt by Mr. Simpson to deduct civil legal expenses
for wrongful death, the Draper case may be more applicable. As set forth
above,' 8 a Mrs. McCullough made statements that Draper was pro-communist
and that she wanted to affect his business income ("to hit these boys in their box
office"). Draper was able to deduct his legal expenses as plaintiff in a libel action
even though the case ended in a hung jury. 9 Similarly, it would appear, Mr.
Simpson could deduct his expenses for defense against a wrongful death suit. The
opposing party in Draper, and the opposing party in civil litigation against Mr.
Simpson, would both appear to be motivated by an intent to affect the business
income of Draper and Simpson respectively.
Ron Goldman's father and mother, as well as Nicole Brown Simpson's
family did, in fact, instigate wrongful death suits against Mr. Simpson." Even if
the parties litigating against Mr. Simpson have not made a statement as clear as
Mrs. McCullough's against Draper, it would appear that a fact-finder could infer
such an intent by the prosecuting party directed at Mr. Simpson's assets. 6 Worse
yet, from the perspective of the families of Ron Goldman and Nicole Brown
156. See supra notes 16-23, 85 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text
159. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text
160. Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC03640, (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County May 4, 1995); Brown
v. Simpson, No. SC036876 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County June 12, 1995).
161. The parties may be circumspect in their statements to the press during the civil litiga-
tion. See. e.g., Stephane Simon, Simpson Seeks to Seal Depositions in 2 Civil Suits, L.A.
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Simpson, if they are seeking to monetarily penalize 0. J. Simpson, and if pay-
ments are made in a settlement or because of a judgement for the wrongful deaths,
those payments might also be deductible, as apparently were the restitutionary
payments by Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken referred to at the outset of this arti-
cle.,,,
IX. CONCLUSION
A defendant such as O.J. Simpson may be able to deduct his legal expens-
es for his defense in a criminal prosecution, even extending to murder. Under the
basic test set forth in the case of United States v. Gilmore, legal expenses are
deductible if the legal claim has its origin in the taxpayer's business or income-
seeking activity.' However, the courts, in fact-based analyses, appear to have
extended the concept of connection of a legal claim to a taxpayer's business or
income-seeking activity.1
In an analogous situation, country western singer Conway Twitty was
allowed to deduct expenses of a fast food restaurant he started because he paid
those expenses to preserve his music business reputation.' Also, movie script
writer Waldo Salt was allowed to deduct his expenses for legal representation
before the House Un-American Activities Committee investigating the
Communist infiltration of the motion picture business."
It could easily be argued that Mr. Simpson incurred legal expenses to pro-
tect his business reputation as did Conway Twitty.'61 Also it could be argued that
Mr. Simpson, as Waldo Salt, was required to incur his expenses when confronted
by an investigation of his business as an entertainment and sports figure. The
Simpson defense consistently argued, and apparently persuaded jurors, that Mr.
Simpson was investigated as a result of a motive, by at least some of the prose-
cuting parties, to destroy Mr. Simpson's business.'63 As the Howard, Lewis, and
Draper cases indicate, in addition to Salt, the motive of the prosecuting party to
affect the defendant's business or income-seeking activities may be the criterion
which the courts are actually using, to determine deductibility of legal expenses.' 69
The expenses of even an unsuccessful criminal defense are deductible
TiMEs, Oct. 27, 1995, at part B, at 1 (the attorney for Nancy Rufo, Goldman's mother, origi-
nally said he would oppose an order to seal depositions).
162. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 16-23, 85 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 16-23, 93-95 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
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under Tellier.70 However, in murder cases the taxpayers have had an uphill battle
to convince courts that the claim arose out of a business rather than personal con-
text.' Defendants such as Mr. Simpson may be able to convince a court that a
prosecution for murder arose out of a business context because of the motive of
the prosecuting party. Although Tellier leads to the conclusion that Simpson's
legal expenses would be deductible whether his defense was successful or not,
this article suggests that a taxpayer so situated may have to prevail in a criminal
defense when the connection of the legal claim to the business or income-seeking
is rather attenuated.'
Previous cases involving sports/entertainment figures and legal expenses
seem to indicate that the expenses can be deductible under the same Gilmore test
if the connection to business or income-seeking can be successfully established.7 1
Defendants such as Mr. Simpson may even be able to deduct legal expenses for
the defense of wrongful death civil suits and possibly any damage payments pur-
suant to a settlement or judgment. 174 Given the number of sports and entertain-
ment figures who have had "brushes with the law," this article may prove use-
ful. 75 As suggested in the introduction, the author takes some solace in that these
arguments may make legal services more affordable for deserving taxpayer
defendants. 76
170. See supra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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